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Abstract Real-time systems usually involve a subtle interaction of a number of dis-
tributed components and have a high degree of parallelism, which makes their perfor-
mance analysis quite complex. Thus, traditional techniques, such as simulation, or the
state-based formal methods usually fail to produce reasonable results. In this paper,
we propose to use higher-order-logic theorem proving for the performance analysis of
real-time systems. The idea is to formalize the real-time system as a logical conjunc-
tion of higher-order-logic predicates, whereas each one of these predicates define an
autonomous component or process of the given real-time system. The random or un-
predictable behavior found in these components is modeled as random variables. This
formal specification can then be used in a higher-order-logic theorem prover (HOL) to
reason about both functional and performance related properties of the given real-time
system. In order to illustrate the practical effectiveness of our approach, we present
the analysis of the Stop-and-Wait protocol, which is a classical example of real-time
systems. The functional correctness of the protocol is verified by proving that the pro-
tocol ensures reliable data transfers. Whereas, the average message delay relation is
verified in HOL for the sake of performance analysis. The paper includes the protocol’s
formalization details along with the HOL proof sketches for the major theorems.
Keywords Communication Protocols · Higher-order-logic · HOL Theorem Prover ·
Probability Theory · Real-Time Systems
1 Introduction
Real-time systems can be characterized as systems for which the correctness of an op-
eration is dependant not only on its logical correctness but also on the time taken.
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Some commonly used real-time system applications include embedded systems, digi-
tal circuits with uncertain delays and communication protocols. Due to the increased
usage of real-time systems in safety critical and extremely sensitive applications such
as medicine, military and space travel, their correctness and performance has become
imperative. The functional verification and performance evaluation tasks in this do-
main are quite challenging as the present age real-time systems usually involve a subtle
interaction of a number of distributed components and have a high degree of paral-
lelism. The level of sophistication found in current real-time systems demands formal
specification of requirements and thus traditional techniques, like simulation, fail to
provide the necessary level of assuredness about what is being built is actually what
was intended. On the other hand, formal methods offer a promising solution.
A number of elegant approaches for the formal functional verification of real-time
systems can be found in the open literature using state-based or theorem proving
techniques (e.g. [1,7,2,3]). However, most of these existing formal verification tools are
only capable of specifying and verifying hard deadlines, i.e., properties where a late
response is considered to be incorrect. For example, while proving the message delivery
characteristic of a communication protocol, we can only check if the message is delivered
for sure within a specific duration in time, say 100 seconds, for all possible scenarios.
Even though this information is quite useful for establishing functional correctness, it
usually proves to be quite insufficient for performance analysis. Consider the example of
two communication protocols for which the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
of the message delay, i.e., the probability that the message delay is less than or equal
to time t, is given in Table 1. Both protocols satisfy the hard deadline of a message
being delivered within 100 seconds as the probability of the message delay being less
than or equal to 100 seconds is 1. Now, it can also be observed that they do not satisfy
the hard deadline of the message being delivered within 80 seconds as for both of them
there exist some cases for which the message is not delivered. So from the perspective of
these hard deadline verification results, both protocols seem to behave quite similarly
and the huge difference in the performance of the two protocols remains hidden.
The above example clearly demonstrates the significance of verifying soft deadlines,
i.e., properties that provide the quality of service in terms of probabilistic quantities or
averages, for performance analysis of real-time systems. Recently, several state-based
formal approaches have been proposed for the verification of soft deadlines for real-
time systems (e.g. [27,6,26]). However, all these approaches share the same inherent
limitation that is the reduced expressive power of their automata based or Petri net
based specification formalism. On top of that, either there is no mechanism to verify
the expectation or average value in these techniques or even if it does exist then the
underlying infrastructure cannot be regarded as completely formal. Whereas, expecta-
tion is considered to be one of the most widely used characteristics for the performance
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of the random variable in a single number. For example, in the PRISM model checker
[25], probabilistic models can be augmented with cost or rewards, i.e., real values as-
sociated with certain states or transitions of the model, which allows us to analyze the
average values related to these rewards. Duflot et al. [11] used this aspect of PRISM
to conduct the performance analysis of a CSMA/CD protocol, which is a real-time
communication protocol. It is important to note that the meaning ascribed to these
properties is, of course, dependent on the definitions of the rewards themselves and
thus the solutions obtained using this kind of approaches are approximate as has been
clearly stated in [11].
Due to the immaturity of formal methods in verifying soft deadlines and using them
for performance evaluation of real-time systems, the current state-of-the-art is based on
constructing abstract models that are analyzed by simulation or by applying stochastic
process theory using paper-and-pencil proof methods. Besides the inaccuracy of results
by simulation based methods and the drawbacks associated with paper-and-pencil proof
methods, a major limitation of this approach is that the model used for performance
analysis is usually quite far in abstraction level from the one used for formal functional
verification. This fact makes the equivalence verification between these two models
very difficult, if not impossible, and thus leaves a major gap in the completeness of the
functional verification and performance analysis tasks. These kind of limitations may
lead to inaccurate performance analysis, which in turn can have disastrous consequences
if the given real-time system is to be used in a safety or financial critical domain. One
of the well-known incidents in this regard include the loss, in December 1999, of the
Mars Polar Lander [29]; a $165 million NASA spacecraft launched to survey Martian
conditions. The Mars Polar Lander is believed to be lost mainly because of its engine
shutdown while it was still 40 meters above the Mars surface. The engine shutdown
happened due to the vibrations caused by the deployment of the lander’s legs, i.e.,
a probabilistic behavior, that gave false indication that spacecraft had landed. Some
other such incidents related to inaccurate or inadequate performance analysis of real-
time systems include the loss of $125 million Mars Climate Orbiter [28] in 1998 and
the performance degradation of the Microsofts IIS indexing service DLL due to the
buffer overflow problem caused by the “Code Red” worm in 2001 [9], which resulted in
a loss of over $2 billion to the company. A more recent incident is the faulty operation
of the fly-by-wire primary flight control real-time software of a Boeing 777, operated
by the Malaysia Airlines, in August 2005 [5], which could have resulted in the loss of
177 passenger lives if the pilot had not manually taken over the autopilot program in
time.
To overcome the above mentioned limitations of existing performance analysis tech-
niques, we propose to conduct the performance evaluation of real-time systems within
the sound core of a higher-order-logic theorem prover [14]. The main motivation behind
this choice is to leverage upon the high expressiveness of higher-order-logic to formally
specify and reason about the temporal properties and random behaviors of the present
age complex real-time systems. The proposed approach is primarily based upon the
previous work reported for the functional verification of hard real-time systems [7], the
formalization of random variables [23] and the verification of expectation properties
for discrete random variables [19]. The idea is to formally specify the given real-time
system as a logical conjunction of higher-order-logic predicates [7], whereas each one
of these predicates defines an autonomous component or process of the given real-
time system, while representing the unpredictable or random elements in the system
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properties for various parameters for this formal model can then be verified using an
interactive theorem prover with the help of the useful theorems already proved in [7,
23,19]. Since the analyses is conducted within the core of a mechanical theorem prover,
there would be no question about the soundness or the precision of the results. Also,
there is no equivalence verification required between the models used for functional
verification and performance evaluation as the same formal model is used for both of
these analysis in this approach. On the other hand, the downside of the above approach
is the associated significant user interaction. It is important to note here that the pro-
posed approach should not be viewed as an alternative to methods such as simulation
and model-checking for the performance analysis of real-time systems but rather as a
complementary technique.
In order to illustrate the practical effectiveness of our approach, this paper presents
the functional verification and performance analysis of a variant of the Stop-and-Wait
protocol [13], which is a classical example of a real-time system. The Stop-and-Wait
protocol utilizes the principles of error detection and retransmission and is a funda-
mental mechanism for reliable communication between computers. Indeed, it is one
of the most important part of the Internet’s Transmission Control Protocol (TCP).
The main motivation behind selecting the Stop-and-Wait protocol as a case study for
our approach is its widespread popularity in the literature regarding real-time system
analysis methodologies. The Stop-and-Wait protocol and some of its closely related
variants have been checked formally for functional verification using theorem proving
[7], state-based formal approaches [35,4,12] and a combination of both techniques [22]
and their performance has been analyzed using a number of innovative state-based for-
mal or semi-formal techniques (e.g. [30,33,37,15]). But like other real-time systems, to
the best of our knowledge, there is no mechanized approach reported in the literature
that utilizes a single model of the Stop-and-Wait protocol and could verify its func-
tional correctness and precisely analyze its performance. This paper tends to fill this
gap as we present the functional verification and the performance analysis, based on
the precise average delay for a single message transmission, for the Stop-and-Wait pro-
tocol using the HOL theorem prover [17]. We have chosen HOL in order to build upon
the existing formalization presented in [7,23,19]. The proposed approach is not specific
to the HOL theorem prover though and can be adapted to any other higher-order-logic
theorem prover, such as Isabelle [31] and PVS [32], as well.
The variant of the Stop-and-Wait protocol that is analyzed in this paper utilizes
two distinct sequence numbers (0 and 1) and is usually termed as the Alternating
Bit Protocol (ABP). The analysis is done assuming an ideal (noiseless) channel for
ACK messages, a fixed value of channel propagation delay for both data and ACK
messages and a fixed value of 1 unit time for the processing delay at both sender and
receiver stations. The main intent behind using these assumptions is to reduce the
proof clutter and thus to simplify the understandability of the proofs presented in this
paper. If required, these assumptions can be removed and a more generalized version
of the Stop-and-Wait protocol can also be verified using the methodology presented in
this paper. For example, the channel for the ACK messages can be made noisy using
the approach for handling the noisy data message channel illustrated in this paper.
Similarly, the processing delay can be made a variable quantity by using a similar
approach that we use to handle the variable time-out and data transmission delays.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of mod-
eling random variables and verifying their expectation properties in HOL. In Section 3,
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delay characteristic. Next, in Section 4, we present a higher-order-logic specification of
the Stop-and-Wait protocol. We verify the functional correctness of this specification
using the HOL theorem prover in Section 5. Then, in Section 6, we conduct the perfor-
mance analysis of the Stop-and-Wait protocol based on its formal specification in HOL.
We mainly verify the message delay characteristic of the Stop-and-Wait protocol, which
is the most widely used performance measuring parameter for communication proto-
cols, first under noise-free conditions and then with the consideration of the channel
noise. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Random Variables and their Expectation in HOL
This section first summarizes a methodology for the formalization of probabilistic al-
gorithms [23], which in turn can be used to model random variables as well. Then we
present a higher-order-logic formalization of the expectation theory [19], which allows
us to verify mean or average values associated with discrete random variables in HOL.
The intent is to introduce the main ideas along with some notation that is going to be
used in the next sections.
2.1 Formalization of Random Variables in HOL
Random variables are the core component of conducting probabilistic performance
analysis of real-time systems. They can be formalized in higher-order logic as deter-
ministic functions with access to an infinite Boolean sequence B∞; a source of infinite
random bits [23]. These deterministic functions make random choices based on the re-
sult of popping the top most bit in the infinite Boolean sequence and may pop as many
random bits as they need for their computation. When the functions terminate, they
return the result along with the remaining portion of the infinite Boolean sequence to
be used by other programs. Thus, a random variable which takes a parameter of type
α and ranges over values of type β can be represented in HOL by the function.
F : α→ B∞ → β ×B∞
As an example, consider the Bernoulli( 12 ) random variable that returns 1 or 0 with
equal probability 12 . It can be formalized in HOL as follows
`def bit = (λs. (if shd s then 1 else 0, stl s))
where s is the infinite Boolean sequence and shd and stl are the sequence equivalents
of the list operation ’head’ and ’tail’. Some formalization of the mathematical measure
theory in HOL is also presented in [23], which can be used to define a probability
function prob from sets of infinite Boolean sequences to real numbers between 0 and
1. The domain of prob is the set E of events of the probability. Both prob and E
are defined using the Carathe´odory’s Extension theorem, which ensures that E is a
σ-algebra: closed under complements and countable unions. The formalized prob and
E can be used to prove probabilistic properties for random variables such as
` prob {s | fst (bit s) = 1} = 1/2
6where the function fst selects the first component of a pair and {x|C(x)} represents
a set of all x that satisfy the condition C in HOL.
The above mentioned approach has been successfully used to formalize and verify
both discrete [23,19] and continuous random variables [18] in HOL. In this paper,
we will utilize the models for Bernoulli and Geometric random variables formalized
as higher-order-logic functions prob bernoulli and prob geom and verified using the
following probability mass function (PMF) relations in [23] and [19], respectively.
Theorem 1: ` ∀ p.
0 ≤ p ∧ p ≤ 1 =⇒ (prob {s | fst (prob_bernoulli p s)} = p)
Theorem 2: ` ∀ n p. 0 < p ∧ p ≤ 1 =⇒
(prob {s | fst (prob_geom p s) = (n + 1)} = p * (1 − p) pow n)
The Geometric random variable returns the number of Bernoulli trials needed to
get one success and thus cannot return 0. This is why we have (n+1) in Theorem 2,
where n is a positive integer {0, 1, 2, 3 · · ·}. Similarly, the probability p in Theorem
2 represents the probability of succuss and thus needs to be greater than 0 for this
theorem to be true as has been specified in the precondition.
2.2 Verification of Expectation Properties for Discrete Random Variables in HOL
Expectation theory plays a vital role in the domain of probabilistic performance anal-
ysis as it is a lot easier to judge performance issues based on the average value of a
random variable, which is a single number, rather than its distribution function. A
higher-order-logic definition of the expectation function for discrete random variables
that attain values in positive integers only has been presented in [19] and is given below
`def ∀ R. expec R = suminf (λn. & n * prob {s | fst (R s) = n})
where the mathematical notions of the probability function prob and random variable R
have been inherited from [23], as presented in the previous section. The function suminf
represents the HOL formalization of the infinite summation of a real sequence [16] and
the operator & transforms a positive integer to its corresponding real value. The function
expec accepts the random variable R with data type B∞ → (positive integer×B∞),
and returns a real number. The above definition can be used to verify the average
values of most of the commonly used discrete random variables, e.g., [19] presents the
verification of average value of the Geometric random variable as
Theorem 3: ` ∀ p. 0 < p ∧ p ≤ 1 =⇒ (expec (λs. prob_geom p s) = 1 / p)
In order to target the verification of expected values of probabilistic systems involv-
ing multiple random variables, the formal proof of the linearity of expectation property
[24] has been provided in [19]. By this property, the expectation of a sum of random








where Ex denotes expectation. Similarly, another useful property of expectation, i.e.,
7Ex[aR] = aEx[R] (2)
has also be verified using the HOL theorem prover in [21]. The above expectation prop-
erties, given in Equations 1 and 2, can be combined to verify the following expectation
property
Ex[aR+ b] = aEx[R] + b (3)
which can be expressed in HOL as
Theorem 4: ` ∀ a b R.
(expec (λs. (a * fst (R s) + b,snd (R s))) = & a * expec R + & b)
for a random variable R with a well-defined expected value. We will use Theorem 4 in
Section 6.2 to verify the average message delay relation of the Stop-and-Wait protocol.
3 Stop-and-Wait Protocol
Stop-and-Wait [13] is a basic Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ) protocol that ensures
reliable data transfers across noisy channels. In a Stop-and-Wait system, both sending
and receiving stations have error detection capabilities. The operation is illustrated in
Fig. 1 using the following notation.
– tf : Data message transmission time
– ta: ACK message transmission time
– tprop: One-way signal propagation delay between transmitter and receiver
– tproc: Processing time required for error detection in the received message at both
transmitter and receiver
– tout: Timeout period
The transmitter sends a data message to the receiver and spends tf time units in
doing so. It then stops and waits to receive an acknowledgement (ACK) of reception
of that message from the receiver. If no ACK is received within a given time out, tout,
period, the data message is resent by the transmitter and once again it stops and starts
waiting for the ACK (Fig. 1.a). If an ACK is received within the given tout period then
the transmitter checks the received message for errors during the next tproc time units.
If errors are detected then the ACK is ignored and the data message is resent by the
transmitter after tout expires and once again the transmitter stops and waits for the
ACK (Fig. 1.b). Thus, the main idea is that the transmitter keeps on retransmitting
the same data message, after a pre-defined time-out period, tout, until and unless it
receives a corresponding error-free ACK message from the receiver. When an error-free
ACK message is finally received then the transmitter transmits the next data message
in its queue (Fig. 1.c).
The receiver is always waiting to receive data messages. When a new message
arrives, the receiver checks it for errors during the next tproc time units. If errors are
detected then the data message is ignored and the receiver continues to be in the wait
state (Fig. 1.a), otherwise it initiates the transmission of an ACK message, which takes
ta time units (Fig. 1.b,c).
Under the above mentioned conditions, the ACK message cannot be received before
tprop + tproc + ta + tprop + tproc units of time after sending out a data message. It is,
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therefore, necessary to set tout ≥ 2(tprop+ tproc)+ ta, i.e., the retransmission must not
be allowed to start before the expected arrival time of the ACK is lapsed, for reliable
communication between transmitter and receiver.
ARQ allows the transmitting station to transmit a specific number, usually termed
as sending window, of messages before receiving an ACK frame and the receiving station
to receive and store a specific number, usually termed as receiving window, of error-free
messages even if they arrive out-of-sequence. Generally, both the sending window and
the receiving window are assigned the same value, which is termed as the window size
of the ARQ protocol [34]. The window size for the Stop-and-Wait protocol is 1, as can
be observed from its transmitter and receiver behavior descriptions given above.
9In order to distinguish between new messages and duplicates of previous messages
at the receiver or transmitter, a sequence number is included in the header of both data
and ACK messages [13]. It has been shown that, for correct ARQ operation, the number
of distinct sequence numbers must be at least equal to twice the window size [36]. Thus,
the simplest and the most commonly used version of the Stop-and-Wait protocol uses
two distinct sequence numbers (0 and 1) and is known as the ABP. The transmitter
keeps track of the sequence number of the last data message it had sent, its associated
timer and the message itself in case a retransmission is required. Whereas, the receiver
keeps track of the sequence number of the next data message that it is expecting to
receive. Thus, if an out-of-sequence data message arrives at the receiver, it ignores it
and responds with the ACK for the data message that it was expecting to receive. On
the other hand, when an in-sequence data message arrives at the receiver, it updates
its sequence number by performing a modulo-2 addition with the number 1, i.e., 0 is
updated to 1 and 1 is updated to 0 and responds using this updated sequence number.
Similarly, if an out-of-sequence ACK message appears at the transmitter, it ignores
it and retains the sequence number of the last data message it had sent. Whereas, in
the case of the reception of an in-sequence ACK message, the sequence number at the
transmitter is also updated by performing a modulo-2 addition by 1, which becomes
the sequence number of the next data message as well. More details about sequence
numbering in the Stop-and-Wait protocol can be found in [13].
The most widely used performance metric for Stop-and-Wait protocol is the time
required for the transmitter to send a single data message and know that it has been
successfully received at the receiver. In the case of error-free or noiseless channels,
which do not reorder or lose messages (Fig. 1.c), the message transmission delay is
given by
tf + tprop + tproc + ta + tprop + tproc (4)
On the other hand, in the presence of noise, every damaged or lost message (data or
ACK) will cause a retransmission from the transmitter and thus wastes tf + tout units
of time (Fig. 1.a,b). Whereas, the final successful transmission will take the amount of
time given in Equation 4. In order to obtain more concise information about this delay,
we consider the probability, p, of a message transmission being in error. This allows us
to model the number of retransmissions in the Stop-and-Wait protocol in terms of a
Geometric random variable, which returns the number of trials required to achieve the
first success, with success probability 1− p. Therefore, the delay of the Stop-and-Wait
protocol can be mathematically expressed as
(tf + tout)(G(1−p) − 1) + tf + tprop + tproc + ta + tprop + tproc (5)
where Gx denotes a Geometric random variable with success probability x. The above
representation allows us to express the average delay of a single data message in a Stop-
and-Wait protocol using the average or mean value of a Geometric random variable as
follows
(tf + tout)p
1− p + tf + tprop + tproc + ta + tprop + tproc (6)
The main scope of the rest of the paper is to formally specify the Stop-and-wait
protocol, described in this section, as a real-time system and mechanically verify its
functional correctness and average message delay relation, given in Equation 6, in HOL.
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Fig. 2 Logical Structure of an ARQ Protocol
4 Formal Specification of the Stop-and-Wait Protocol in HOL
A real-time system and its environment may be viewed as a bunch of concurrent, com-
municating processes that are autonomous, i.e., they can communicate asynchronously.
The behavior of these processes over time may be specified by higher-order-logic pred-
icates on positive integers [7]. Whereas, these positive integers represent the ticks of
a clock counting physical time in any appropriate units, e.g., nanoseconds. The gran-
ularity of the clock’s tick is believed to be chosen in such a way that it is sufficiently
fine to detect properties of interest. The behavior of a real-time system can now be
formally specified by combining the corresponding process specifications (higher-order-
logic predicates) using logical conjunction. In a similar way, additional constraints for
the real-time system such as initial conditions or any assumptions, if required to ensure
the correct behavior of the model, can also be defined as predicates and combined with
its formal specification using logical conjunctions.
Based on the above mentioned approach, we formally specify the Stop-and-Wait
protocol as a combination of six processes, as shown in Fig. 2. The protocol mainly
consists of three major modules, i.e., the sender or the transmitter, the receiver and
the communication channel. Each one of these modules can be subdivided into two
processes as both the sender and the receiver transmit messages and receive them
and the channel between the sender and receiver consists of two logical channels: one
carrying data messages from the sender to the receiver and one carrying ACK messages
in the opposite direction.
In the following, we present the data type definitions, the six higher-order-logic
predicates, corresponding to each one of the processes in Fig. 2, and finally the formal
specification of the Stop-and-Wait protocol, which also includes the predicates for as-
sumptions and initial conditions. We include the timing information associated with
every action in these predicates so that the corresponding model can be utilized to
reason about the message delay characteristic of the Stop-and-Wait protocol.
4.1 Type Definitions
The input to the Stop-and-Wait protocol, source, is basically a list of data messages
that can be modeled in HOL by a list of ∗data elements
source: *data list
where ∗data represents any concrete HOL data type such as a record, a character,
an integer or an n-bit word. The output of the protocol, sink, is also a list of data
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messages that grows with time as new data messages are delivered to the receiver. It
can be modeled in HOL as follows:
sink: time -> *data list
where time is assigned the HOL data-type for positive integers, num, and represents
physical time in this case. This kind of variable, which is time dependant, is termed as
a history in this paper.
The arrows in Fig. 2 between processes represent information that is shared between
the sender, channel and receiver. Data messages are transmitted from the sender to the
receiver (dataS, dataR) and ACK messages are transmitted in the opposite direction
(ackR, ackS). These messages are transmitted across the Stop-and-Wait protocol in
a form of a packet, which can be modeled in HOL as a pair containing a sequence
number and a message element
packet: num x *data
where num is used here for the sequence number and the ∗data represents the message.
Since we are dealing with an unreliable channel, the output of a channel may or may
not be a packet. In order to model the no-packet case in HOL, a data-type non packet
is defined, which has only one value, i.e., one. Every message can either be of type
packet or of type non packet.
message: packet + non_packet
4.2 Data Transmission
The process DATA TRANS in Fig. 2 characterizes the data transmission behavior of the
Stop-and-Wait protocol and the corresponding predicate is defined as follows.
`def ∀ ws sn dataS s rem i ackS tout tf dtout dtf.
DATA_TRANS_STOP_WAIT ws sn dataS s rem i ackS tout tf dtout dtf =
∀t.
(if ¬((tli (i t) (rem t)) = []) ∧ i t < ws then
(if dtf t = 0 then
(i (t + 1) = i t + 1) ∧ (dtout (t + 1) = tout − 1) ∧
(dtf (t + 1) = tf) ∧
(dataS t =
new_packet (((s t) + (i t)) mod sn) (hdi (i t) (rem t)))
else
(i (t + 1) = i t) ∧ (dtout (t + 1) = tout) ∧
(dtf (t + 1) = dtf t − 1) ∧ (dataS t = set_non_packet))
else
(dtf (t + 1) = tf) ∧ (dataS t = set_non_packet)) ∧
(if
(dtout t = 1) ∨
good_packet (ackS t) ∧
((label (ackS t)) − (s t)) mod sn < ws
then
(i (t + 1) = i t − 1) ∧ (dtout (t + 1) = tout)
else
(i (t + 1) = i t) ∧ (dtout (t + 1) = dtout t − 1))
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The variables ws and sn represent the window size and the number of distinct se-
quence numbers available for the protocol, respectively. By using these variables in our
definitions, instead of their corresponding fixed values of 1 and 2 for the case of the
Stop-and-Wait protocol, we attain two benefits. Firstly, it makes our definitions more
generic as they can now be used, with minor updates, to formally model the corre-
sponding processes of other ARQ protocols, such as Go-Back-N and Selective-Repeat
[13], as well. Secondly, this allows us to establish a logical implication between our
definitions for the six processes (Fig. 2) to the corresponding definitions for the Sliding
Window protocol, given in [7]. This relationship can be used to inherit the functional
correctness theorem, verified for the Sliding Window protocol in [7], for our Stop-and-
Wait protocol model and thus saves us a considerable amount of verification time and
effort. More details on this are given in Section 5. It is important to note that in order
to model the correct behavior for the Stop-and-Wait protocol, we will assign the values
of 1 and 2 to the variables ws and sn, respectively, in an assumption that is used in all
of the theorems that we verify for the Stop-and-Wait protocol.
The history dataS represents the data messages transmitted by the sender at any
particular time. The history s represents, modulo sn, the sequence number of the first
unacknowledged data message. Data remaining to be sent at any time is represented by
the history rem that has type time→ ∗data list. Whereas, the history i: time→ num
is used to identify the number of data messages, at any particular time, that have been
transmitted by the sender but are still unacknowledged by the receiver. The history
ackS represents the ACK messages received by the sender at any particular time. The
variables tout and tf hold the values for the tout and tf delays, defined in Section 3,
and histories dtout and dtf keep track of the timers associated with these delays.
The HOL functions tli and hdi, in the above definition, accept two arguments,
i.e., a list l and a positive integer n, and return the tail of the list l starting from
its nth element and the nth element of the list l, respectively. Whereas, the functions
new packet and set non packet declare a message of type packet (using its two argu-
ments) and non packet, respectively. The function label returns the sequence number
of a packet and the predicate good packet checks the message type of its argument and
returns False if it is non packet and True otherwise. The function x mod n returns
the modulo-n representation of the number x.
The definition of DATA TRANS STOP WAIT should be read as follows. At all times t,
check for the transmission conditions, i.e., there is data available to be transmitted
(¬((tli (i t) (rem t)))=[]) and the number of unacknowledged messages is less
than the window size (i t < ws). If the transmission conditions are satisfied, then
wait for the next tf time units, i.e., decrement the timer dtf by one at every increment
of the time until it reaches 0 and during this time maintain the values of histories i
and dtout while holding the transmission of a new packet to the channel. Once tf time
units have elapsed, i.e., the contents of dtf timer become 0, then instantly transmit
the (i t)th message in the window (hdi (i t) (rem t)) using the sequence number
(((s t) + (i t)) mod sn) and increment the value of the history i by 1, activate
the timer dtout, associated with the tout delay, by decrementing its value by 1 and
initialize the timer dtf, associated with the tf delay, to its default value of tf, in
the next increment of time t. On the other hand, for all times t for which one of the
transmission conditions is not satisfied, no message is transmitted (set non packet)
and the initial value of the dtf timer is maintained. The values of i and dtout, under
the no transmission conditions, depend on the event if the timer dtout reaches 1 or an
ACK message (good packet (ackS t)) is received for a data message that has been
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sent and not yet acknowledged, i.e., if the difference between the label of (ackS t) and
the sender’s sequence number is less than ws ((label (ackS t)) - (s t) mod sn) <
ws). If this event happens, then the timer dtout is initialized to its default value tout
and the value of i is decremented by 1 in the next increment of time t. Otherwise,
we remain in the wait state until the timer dtout expires or a valid ACK is received,
while maintaining the value of i and decrementing the timer dtout by one at every
increment of the time t.
4.3 Data Reception
The process DATA RECV in Fig. 2 characterizes the data reception behavior, at the
receiver end, of the Stop-and-Wait protocol and the corresponding predicate is defined
as follows
`def ∀ sn dataR sink r.
DATA_RECV_STOP_WAIT sn dataR sink r =
∀t.
(if good_packet (dataR t) ∧ (label (dataR t) = r t) then
(sink (t + 1) = sink t ++ [ data (dataR t) ]) ∧
(r (t + 1) = ((r t) + 1) mod sn)
else
(sink (t + 1) = sink t) ∧ (r (t + 1) = r t))
where the history dataR represents the data messages received by the receiver at any
particular time. The history r represents, modulo sn, the sequence number of the data
message that the receiver is expecting to receive. The function data returns the data
portion of a packet and ++ is the symbol for the list append function in HOL.
The definition of DATA RECV STOP WAIT should be read as follows. At all times t, if
(dataR t) is not a non packet, i.e., (good packet (dataR t)), and the sequence field
of the packet (dataR t) is equal to the next number to be output to the sink (label
(dataR t) = r t) then the data part of the packet is appended to the sink list and r
is updated to the sequence number of the next message expected, i.e., (r (t + 1) =
((r t) + 1) mod sn). Otherwise if a valid data packet is not received then the output
list sink and r retain their old values.
We have intentionally assigned a fixed value of 1 to the processing delay (tp), which
specifies the time required for processing an incoming message at both transmitter
and receiver ends, in order to simplify the understandability of the proofs presented
in the next two sections. If required, the processing delay can be made a variable
quantity by using a similar approach that we used for tout and tf delays in the predicate
DATA TRANS STOP WAIT.
4.4 ACK Transmission
The process ACK TRANS in Fig. 2 characterizes the ACK transmission behavior of the
Stop-and-Wait protocol and the corresponding predicate is defined as follows
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`def ∀ sn ackR r ackty ack_msg ta dta rec_flag.
ACK_TRANS_STOP_WAIT sn ackR r ackty ack_msg ta dta rec_flag =
∀t.
(ackty t = ack_msg) ∧
(if ¬(r t = r (t − 1)) then
(if dta t = 0 then
(ackR t = new_packet (((r t) − 1) mod sn) (ackty t)) ∧
(dta (t + 1) = ta) ∧ (rec_flag (t + 1) = F)
else
(ackR t = set_non_packet) ∧ (dta (t + 1) = dta t − 1) ∧
(rec_flag (t + 1) = T))
else
(if rec_flag t then
(if dta t = 0 then
(ackR t = new_packet (((r t) − 1) mod sn) (ackty t)) ∧
(dta (t + 1) = ta) ∧ (rec_flag (t + 1) = F)
else
(ackR t = set_non_packet) ∧
(dta (t + 1) = dta t − 1) ∧ (rec_flag (t + 1) = T))
else
(ackR t = set_non_packet) ∧ (dta (t + 1) = ta) ∧
(rec_flag (t + 1) = F)))
where the history ackR represents the ACK messages transmitted by the sender at any
particular time. The history ackty represents the data part of the ACK message that
could be used to specify properties of protocols, such as negative acknowledgements:
a type of acknowledgement message which enables the sender to retransmit messages
efficiently. The variable ack msg represents a constant data field that is sent along with
every ACK message by the receiving station, as in the Stop-and-Wait protocol the ACK
messages do not convey any other information except the reception of a data message.
The variable ta holds the value for the ta delay, defined in Section 3, and the history
dta keeps track of the timer associated with this delay. Whereas, the history rec flag
keeps track of the reception of a data message at the receiver until a corresponding
ACK message is sent.
The definition of ACK TRANS STOP WAIT should be read as follows. At all times t, the
history ackty is assigned the value of the default ACK message for the Stop-and-Wait
protocol, i.e., ack msg. For all times t, if an in-sequence data message arrives at the
receiver ¬(r t = r (t - 1)), then instantly transmit an ACK message if the contents
of the timer dta are 0, otherwise do not issue an ACK and retain the information of
receiving a valid data in the rec flag while activating the timer associated with ta by
decrementing its value by 1. On the other hand, for all times t for which no in-sequence
data message arrives at the receiver, check if there exists a valid data message that has
successfully arrived at the receiver but has not been acknowledged so far (rec flag
t). If that is the case, then if the timer associated with the delay ta has expired (dta
t = 0) then instantly issue the respective ACK message while initializing histories dta
and rec flag to their default values of ta and False, respectively. Otherwise wait for
the dta timer to expire while holding the ACK transmission and the value of history
rec flag and decrementing the value of the timer dta by 1. On the other hand, if
there is no valid data arrival or no pending ACK transmission, then the receiver is not
allowed to transmit an ACK message and it assigns the histories dta and rec flag to
their default values of ta and False, respectively.
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4.5 ACK Reception
The process ACK RECV in Fig. 2 characterizes the ACK reception behavior, at the send-
ing station, of the Stop-and-Wait protocol and the corresponding predicate is defined
as follows
`def ∀ ws sn ackS rem s.
ACK_RECV_STOP_WAIT ws sn ackS rem s =
∀t.
(if
good_packet (ackS t) ∧
((label (ackS t)) − (s t)) mod sn < ws
then
(s (t + 1) = ((label (ackS t)) + 1) mod sn) ∧
(rem (t + 1) = tli (((s (t + 1)) − (s t)) mod sn) (rem t))
else
(s (t + 1) = s t) ∧ (rem (t + 1) = rem t))
The sender checks the label of every ACK message it receives to find out if it is one
of the messages that has been sent and not yet acknowledged, i.e., if the modulo-sn
difference between the sequence number of (ackS t) and sender’s sequence number is
less than ws, i.e., (((label (ackS t)) - (s t)) mod sn < ws). If this is the case,
then the sender slides the window up by updating the sender’s history (s t) to be the
first message not known to be accepted: (((label (ackS t)) + 1) mod sn) and by
updating (rem t), the list of data remaining to be sent. Otherwise, both histories s
and rem retain their previous values. As in the case of the receiver, we again assigned
a fixed value of 1 to the processing delay (tp).
4.6 Communication Channel
The processes DATA CHAN and ACK CHAN in Fig. 2 characterize the communication chan-
nel connecting the sender and receiver in the Stop-and-Wait. In this paper, we are
dealing with a channel that has a fixed propagation delay (tprop). We present two def-
initions for the communication channel for the Stop-and-Wait protocol; the first one
models the channel that is noiseless and the second one models a noisy channel, which
may loose packets. The noiseless channel predicate is defined as follows
`def ∀ in out d tprop.
NOISELESS_CHANNEL_STOP_WAIT in out d tprop =
∀t.
(if t < tprop then
out t = set_non_packet
else
out t = in (t − d t)) ∧ 0 < tprop ∧ (d t = tprop)
where the histories in, out and d represent the input message, output message and
the propagation delay for the channel at a particular time, respectively. The variable
tprop represents the fixed value of channel delay (d t) for all t. According to the
above definition, the output from a channel at time t is a copy of the channel’s input
at time (t - tprop).
Next, we define a predicate that models a noisy channel that looses a message with
probability p.
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`def ∀ in out d tprop p bseqt.
NOISY_CHANNEL_STOP_WAIT in out d tprop p bseqt =
∀t.
(if t < tprop then
(out t = set_non_packet) ∧ (bseqt (t + 1) = bseqt t)
else
(if good_packet (in (t − d t)) then
(if ¬fst (prob_bernoulli p (bseqt t)) then
(out t = in (t − d t)) ∧
(bseqt (t + 1) = snd (prob_bernoulli p (bseqt t)))
else
(out t = set_non_packet) ∧
(bseqt (t + 1) = snd (prob_bernoulli p (bseqt t))))
else
(out t = set_non_packet) ∧ (bseqt (t + 1) = bseqt t))) ∧
0 < tprop ∧ (d t = tprop)
In the above definition, we utilized the formal definition of the Bernoulli(p) random
variable to model the noise effect. The variable p represents the probability of channel
error or getting a True from the Bernoulli random variable and the history bseqt keeps
track of the remaining portion of the infinite Boolean sequence, explained in Section 2,
after every call of the Bernoulli random variable. According to the above definition, a
valid packet, that arrives at input of the channel, appears at the output of the channel
after tprop time units with probability 1− p.
4.7 Stop-and-Wait Protocol
We first define some constraints that are required to ensure the correct behavior of
our Stop-and-Wait protocol specification, before giving the actual formalization of the
protocol.
4.7.1 Initial Conditions
In case of the formal specification of real-time systems in HOL, we need to assign
appropriate values to the history variables as initial conditions. We used to following
initial conditions for the Stop-and-Wait protocol
`def ∀ source rem s sink r i ackR dtout dtf dta tout tf ta rec_flag bseqt bseq.
INIT_STOP_WAIT source rem s sink r i
ackR dtout dtf dta tout tf ta rec_flag bseqt bseq =
(rem 0 = source) ∧ (s 0 = 0) ∧ (sink 0 = []) ∧ (r 0 = 0) ∧
(i 0 = 0) ∧ (dtout 0 = tout) ∧ (rec_flag 0 = F) ∧
(ackR 0 = set_non_packet) ∧ (dtf 0 = tf) ∧ (dta 0 = ta) ∧
(bseqt 0 = bseq)
4.7.2 Assumptions
Liveness or Timeliness: While verifying a system, which allows nondeterministic or
probabilistic choice between actions, we often need to include additional constraints
to make sure that events of interest do occur. This has been done by including a
timeliness constraint in the specification of the Stop-and-Wait protocol: if the sender’s
state has not changed over an interval of maxP time units, then the sender assumes that
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the receiver or the channel has crashed and aborts the protocol. A predicate ABORT is
defined that is True only when the protocol aborts and False otherwise. Now, the
predicate ABORT characterizes which abort histories satisfy this constraint.
`def ∀ abort maxP rem.
ABORT abort maxP rem =
∀t.
abort t = (rem t = rem (t − maxP)) ∧ maxP ≤ t ∧ ¬(rem t = [])
A protocol is said to be live if it is never aborted. This kind of liveness is assumed
using the following constraint
LIVE_ASSUMPTION abort = ∀ t. ¬(abort t)
Window Size and Sequence Numbers: As has been mentioned before, instead of using
their exact values of 1 and 2, we used variables ws and sn to represent the window size
and distinct sequence numbers for the Stop-and-Wait protocol in the above predicates.
This has been done, in order to be able to establish logical implication between the
predicates defined in this paper and the corresponding predicates for the Sliding Win-
dow protocol, defined in [7]. Now, we assign the exact values to these variables in an
assumption predicate as follows
`def ∀ ws sn.
WSSN_ASSUM_STOP_WAIT ws sn = (ws = 1) ∧ (sn = 2)
The Stop-and-Wait protocol can now be formalized as the logical conjunction of
the predicates defined in the preceding sections. We present two specifications corre-
sponding to noiseless or ideal and noisy channel conditions.
`def ∀ source sink rem s i r ws sn ackty maxP abort dataS dataR ackS ackR d
tprop dtout dtf dta tf ack_msg ta tout rec_flag.
STOP_WAIT_NOISELESS source sink rem s i r ws sn ackty maxP abort dataS
dataR ackS ackR d tprop dtout dtf dta tf ack_msg ta tout
rec_flag =
INIT_STOP_WAIT source rem s sink r i
ackR dtout dtf dta tout tf ta rec_flag ∧
DATA_TRANS_STOP_WAIT ws sn dataS s rem i ackS tout tf dtout dtf ∧
NOISELESS_CHANNEL_STOP_WAIT dataS dataR d tprop ∧
DATA_RECV_STOP_WAIT sn dataR sink r ∧
ACK_TRANS_STOP_WAIT sn ackR r ackty ack_msg ta dta rec_flag ∧
NOISELESS_CHANNEL_STOP_WAIT ackR ackS d tprop ∧
ACK_RECV_STOP_WAIT ws sn ackS rem s ∧
ABORT abort maxP rem ∧
WSSN_ASSUM_STOP_WAIT ws sn
The higher-order-logic predicate STOP WAIT NOISELESS formally specifies the be-
havior of the Stop-and-Wait protocol under ideal or noiseless conditions as the corre-
sponding predicate for the channel has been used for both data and ACK channels. It
is also important to note here that we do not initialize the history bseqt in the pred-
icate INIT STOP WAIT as there is no need to use the infinite Boolean sequence in this
case. Next, we utilize the noisy channel predicate to formally specify the Stop-and-Wait
protocol with a noisy channel as follows
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`def ∀ source sink rem s i r ws sn ackty maxP abort dataS dataR ackS ackR d
tprop dtout dtf dta tf ack_msg ta tout rec_flag bseqt bseq p.
STOP_WAIT_NOISY source sink rem s i r ws sn ackty maxP abort dataS
dataR ackS ackR d tprop dtout dtf dta tf ack_msg ta tout
rec_flag bseqt bseq =
INIT_STOP_WAIT source rem s sink r i
ackR dtout dtf dta tout tf ta rec_flag bseqt bseq ∧
DATA_TRANS_STOP_WAIT ws sn dataS s rem i ackS tout tf dtout dtf ∧
NOISY_CHANNEL_STOP_WAIT in out d tprop p bseqt ∧
DATA_RECV_STOP_WAIT sn dataR sink r ∧
ACK_TRANS_STOP_WAIT sn ackR r ackty ack_msg ta dta rec_flag ∧
NOISELESS_CHANNEL_STOP_WAIT ackR ackS d tprop ∧
ACK_RECV_STOP_WAIT ws sn ackS rem s ∧
ABORT abort maxP rem ∧
WSSN_ASSUM_STOP_WAIT ws sn
In the above definition, the data channel has been made noisy while a noiseless
channel is used for the ACK messages. This has been done on purpose in order to
reduce the length of the performance analysis proof by avoiding some redundancy.
On the other hand, this decision does not effect the illustration of the idea behind
the performance analysis of the Stop-and-Wait protocol under noisy conditions as we
present the complete handling of a noisy channel in one direction. The analysis can be
extended to both noisy channels by choosing noisy channel predicates for both channels
and then handling the ACK channel in a similar way as the noisy data channel is
handled in Section 6.2 of this paper.
5 Functional Verification of the Stop-and-Wait Protocol in HOL
The job of an ARQ protocol is to ensure reliable transfer of a stream of data from
the sender to the receiver. This functional requirement can be formally specified as the
following predicate [7]
`def ∀ source sink.
REQ source sink =
(∃t. sink t = source) ∧ ∀t n. is_prefix (sink t) (sink (t + n))
where the predicate is prefix is True if its first list argument is a prefix of its second
list argument. According to the predicate REQ, an ARQ protocol satisfies its functional
requirements only if there exists a time at which the sink list becomes equal to the
original source list, i.e., a time when all the data at the sender is transferred, as is, to
the receiver, and the history sink is prefix closed.
A generic formal specification of a Sliding Window protocol, which covers all the
ARQ protocol variants, has been presented in [7]. The specification is based on the
model illustrated in Fig. 2 and has been shown to satisfy the functional correctness
requirement given in the REQ predicate. In order to verify the functional correctness of
our specification of the Stop-and-Wait protocol, we benefit from this work instead of
conducting the verification from scratch. For this purpose, we defined the predicates for
the Stop-and-Wait protocol in such a way that they logically imply the corresponding
predicates used for the formal specification of the Sliding Window protocol presented in
[7]. This relationship allows us to to inherit the functional correctness theorem verified
for the specification of the Sliding Window protocol for our Stop-and-Wait protocol
specification.
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For illustration purposes, consider the example of the data transmission predicate.
It has been defined in [7] for the Sliding Window protocol as follows
`def ∀ ws sn dataS s rem i.
DATA_TRANS_SW ws sn dataS s rem i =
∀t.
(if ¬((tli (i t) (rem t)) = []) ∧ i t < ws then
(dataS t =
new_packet (((s t) + (i t)) mod sn) (hdi (i t) (rem t))) ∨
(dataS t = set_non_packet)
else
dataS t = set_non_packet)
It can be easily observed, and we verified it in HOL using Boolean algebra properties,
that the predicate DATA TRANS STOP WAIT, given in Section 4.2, logically implies the
above predicate
` ∀ ws ns dataS s rem i ackS tout tf dtout dtf.
DATA_TRANS_STOP_WAIT ws ns dataS s rem i ackS tout tf dtout dtf =⇒
DATA_TRANS_SW ws ns dataS s rem i
In a similar way, we were able to prove logical implications between all the pred-
icates used in the formal specification of the Sliding Window protocol and the corre-
sponding predicates used for the formal specification of the Stop-and-Wait protocol.
These relationships allowed us to formally verify the functional correctness of both of
the formal specifications of the Stop-and-Wait protocol, given in the previous section,
in HOL.
Theorem 5: ` ∀ source sink rem s i r ws sn ackty maxP abort dataS dataR ackS
ackR d tprop dtout dtf dta tf ack_msg ta tout rec_flag.
STOP_WAIT_NOISELESS source sink rem s i r ws sn ackty maxP abort dataS
dataR ackS ackR d tprop dtout dtf dta tf ack_msg ta tout
rec_flag ∧
LIVE_ASSUMPTION abort =⇒ REQ source sink
Theorem 6: ` ∀ source sink rem s i r ws sn ackty maxP abort dataS dataR ackS
ackR d tprop dtout dtf dta tf ack_msg ta tout rec_flag
bseqt bseq p.
STOP_WAIT_NOISY source sink rem s i r ws sn ackty maxP abort dataS
dataR ackS ackR d tprop dtout dtf dta tf ack_msg ta tout
rec_flag bseqt bseq ∧
LIVE_ASSUMPTION abort =⇒ REQ source sink
It is important to note that the generic specification of the Sliding Window Protocol
in [7] is quite general and does not include many details, such as the precise conditions
under which the messages are transmitted or acknowledged and the delays (tout, tf ,
ta, etc.) associated with different operations. Therefore, it cannot be used for reasoning
about message delays and thus performance related properties, as such. On the other
hand, the formal specification of the Stop-and-Wait protocol, given in this paper, is
more specific and provides a detailed description of the protocol including the timing
behavior associated with different operations.
Another major point that we would like to mention here is that in order to establish
the logical implication between the two protocol models, we had to introduce some
additional generality in our formal definitions, such as the usage of variables ws and sn
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instead of their exact values of 1 and 2 , respectively. Even though, such generalizations
are not required for the functional description of the Stop-and-Wait protocol, they do
not harm us in any way. They lead to a much faster functional verification, as has been
illustrated in this section. On the other hand, they do not effect the formal reasoning
related to the performance issues, since the exact values for these variables are assigned
in an assumption (WSSN ASSUM STOP WAIT) that is a part of our Stop-and-Wait protocol
specification, which is used for conducting performance analysis.
6 Performance Analysis of the Stop-and-Wait Protocol
In this section, we present the verification of the message delay relations for the Stop-
and-Wait protocol, given in Equations 4 and 6, for noiseless and noisy channels, respec-
tively. The verification is based on the two formal specifications of the Stop-and-Wait
protocol, STOP WAIT NOISELESS and STOP WAIT NOISY, given in Section 4.
6.1 Noiseless Channel Conditions
The first and the foremost step in verifying the message delay characteristic for the
Stop-and-Wait protocol is to formally specify it. Informally speaking, the message delay
refers to the time required for the transmitter to send a single data message and know
that it has been successfully received at the receiver. We specify this in higher-order-
logic as follows
`def ∀ rem source.
DELAY_STOP_WAIT_NOISELESS rem source =
@t. (rem t = TL source) ∧ (rem (t − 1) = source)
where TL refers to the tail function for lists and @x.t refers to the Hilbert choice
operator in HOL (εx.t term) that represents the value of x such that t is True. Thus,
the above specification returns the time t at which the rem list, which represents the
data remaining to be sent at any time t, is reduced by one element from its initially
assigned value of the source list. Indeed it is precisely equal to the message delay of
the first data element in the source list.
Based on the above definition of the message delay and the delays associated with
the formal specification of the Stop-and-Wait protocol (STOP WAIT NOISELESS), Equa-
tion 4 can be formally expressed in HOL as follows
Theorem 7: ` ∀ source sink rem s i r ws sn ackty maxP abort dataS dataR ackS
ackR d tprop dtout dtf dta tf ack_msg ta tout rec_flag.
STOP_WAIT_NOISELESS source sink rem s i r ws sn ackty maxP abort
dataS dataR ackS ackR d tprop dtout dtf dta tf ack_msg
ta tout rec_flag ∧ ¬(source = []) ∧
tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1 ≤ tout =⇒
(DELAY_STOP_WAIT_NOISELESS rem source =
tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1)
It is important to note here that the processing delay, tp, has been assigned a value of 1
in our model, as explained in the previous section. The two assumptions that we have
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added to Theorem 7 ensure that the source list is not an empty list, i.e., ¬(source =
[]), otherwise no data transfer takes place, and the time out period tout is always
greater than or equal to its lower bound specified in Section 3.
Rewriting the proof goal of Theorem 7 with the formal specification of the Stop-
and-Wait protocol delay and removing the Hilbert Choice operator we get the following
expression
(∃x. (rem x = TL source) ∧ (rem (x − 1) = source)) ∧
∀x.
(rem x = TL source) ∧ (rem (x − 1) = source) =⇒
(x = tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1)
The above subgoal is a logical conjunction of two Boolean expressions and it can be
proved to be True only if there exists a time x for which the conditions (rem x = TL
source) and (rem (x - 1) = source) are True and the value of any variable x that
satisfies these conditions is unique and is equal to tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop +
1.
We proceed with the proof of this subgoal by assuming the following expression
Lemma 1: (rem (tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1) = TL source) ∧
(rem ((tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1) − 1) = source))
to be True, which we will prove later, under the given constraints for the Stop-and-
Wait protocol. Lemma 1 leads us to prove the first Boolean expression in our subgoal
as now we know an x = (tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1) for which the given
conditions are True. We verified the second Boolean expression in the subgoal by first
proving the monotonically decreasing characteristic of the history rem under the given
constraints of the Stop-and-Wait protocol, i.e.,
` ∀ a b. a < b =⇒ ∃c. c ++ rem b = rem a
where ++ represents the list append function in HOL. Now, if there exists an x, that
satisfies the conditions (rem x = TL source) and (rem (x - 1) = source), then it
may be equal to, less than or greater than (tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1). For
the later two cases, we reach a contradiction in the assumption list, based on the
monotonically decreasing characteristic of the history rem, whereas, the case when x =
(tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1) verifies our subgoal of interest, which concludes
the proof of Theorem 7 under the assumption of Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 can now be proved in HOL using the definitions of the predicates in
the formal specification of the Stop-and-Wait protocol under noiseless channels. The
corresponding HOL proof step sequence is summarized in Table 2.
6.2 Noisy Channel Conditions
Just like the case of the analysis under noiseless conditions, the message delay, un-
der noisy channel conditions, refers to the time required for the transmitter to send
a single data message and know that it has been successfully received at the re-
ceiver. Though the delay, in this case, is a random quantity since its value is non-
deterministic and depends on the outcomes of a sequence of Bernoulli trials, which
are used to model the channel noise as can be seen in the definition of the predi-
cate NOISY CHANNEL STOP WAIT. Therefore, the message delay for the Stop-and-Wait
protocol under noisy channel needs to be formally specified as a random variable
22
Table 2 HOL Proof Sequence for Lemma 1
Number Formally Verified Statements
1 ∀t.t ≤ tf⇒ (i(t) = 0)
2 ∀t.t < tf⇒ (dataS t = set non packet)
3 ∀t.t < tf+ tprop⇒ (dataR t = set non packet)
4 ∀t.t < tf+ tprop+ 1⇒ (sink t = []) ∧ (r t = 0)
5 ∀t.t ≤ tf+ tprop+ 1⇒ (rec flag t = F) ∧ (dta t = ta)
6 ∀t.t < tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta⇒ (ackR t = set non packet)
7 ∀t.t < tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta+ tprop⇒ (ackS t = set non packet)
8 ∀t.t < tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta+ tprop+ 1⇒ (s t = 0) ∧ (rem t = source)
9 (dataS tf = new packet 0 (HD source)) ∧ (i(tf+ 1) = 1)
10 ∀t.tf < t ∧ t < tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta+ tprop+ 1⇒ (tout+ tf− t ≤ dtout t)
11 ∀t.tf < t ∧ t < tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta+ tprop+ 1⇒
(i t = 1) ∧ (dataS t = set non packet)
12 dataR(tf+ tprop) = new packet 0 (HD source)
13 ∀t.tf+ tprop < t ∧ t < tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta+ tprop+ 1⇒
(dataR t = set non packet)
14 ∀t.tf+ tprop+ 1 ≤ t ∧ t < tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta+ tprop+ 1⇒ (r t = 1)
15 ∀t.tf+ tprop+ 1 ≤ t ∧ t < tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta⇒
(rec flag(t+ 1)) ∧ (dta(t+ 1) = ta− (t− (tf+ tprop)))
16 ackR(tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta) = new packet 0 ack msg
17 rem(tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta+ tprop+ 1) = TL source
`def ∀ rem source bseqt.
DELAY_STOP_WAIT_NOISY rem source bseqt =
((@t. (rem t = TL source) ∧ (rem (t − 1) = source)),
bseqt (@t. (rem t = TL source) ∧ (rem (t − 1) = source)))
where history bseqt t represents the unused portion of the infinite Boolean sequence,
explained in Section 2, after performing the required number of Bernoulli trials at any
given time t. The above specification returns a pair with the first element equal to
the time t that satisfies the two conditions (rem t = TL source) and (rem (t - 1)
= source), and thus represents the random message delay of the first data element
in the source list, and the second element equal to the unused portion of the infinite
Boolean sequence at this time instant t.
As a first step towards the verification of the average value of the random delay
specified in DELAY STOP WAIT NOISY, we establish its relationship with the Geometric
random variable, which basically returns the number of trials to attain the first success
in an infinite sequence of Bernoulli trials [10]. This way, we can benefit from the existing
HOL theorems related to the average characteristic of Geometric random variable, such
as Theorem 2, for the verification of the average value of the message delay of a Stop-
and-Wait protocol. This relationship, given in Equation 5, can be expressed in HOL
using the formal specification of the Stop-and-Wait protocol STOP WAIT NOISY and the
Geometric random variable prob geom [19], as follows
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Theorem 8: ` ∀ source sink rem s i r ws sn ackty maxP abort dataS dataR ackS
ackR d tprop dtout dtf dta tf ack_msg ta tout rec_flag bseqt bseq p.
STOP_WAIT_NOISY source sink rem s i r ws sn ackty maxP abort dataS
dataR ackS ackR d tprop dtout dtf dta tf ack_msg ta tout
rec_flag bseqt bseq ∧
LIVE_ASSUMPTION abort ∧
0 ≤ p ∧ p < 1 ∧ ¬(source = []) ∧
tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1 ≤ tout =⇒
(DELAY_STOP_WAIT_NOISY rem source bseqt =
((tf + tout) * (fst (prob_geom (1 − p) bseq) − 1) + tf +
tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1,
snd (prob_geom (1 − p) bseq)))
where p represents the probability of channel error, i.e., getting a True from the
Bernoulli random variable. The first argument of the function prob geom [19] represents
the probability of success for the corresponding sequence of the Bernoulli trials, which,
in the case of our definition of the noisy channel, is equal to the probability of getting
a False from a Bernoulli trial. The above theorem is proved under the assumption
that the value of the probability p always falls in the interval [0, 1). It is not allowed to
attain the value 1, in order to avoid the case when the channel always rejects incoming
packets and thus leads to no data transfers. The assumption, LIVE ASSUMPTION abort
ensures liveness as has been explained in Section 4. The other assumptions used in the
above theorem are similar to the ones used for the verification of Theorem 7.
We proceed with the verification of Theorem 8 in HOL by first defining the following
two recursive functions
`def (∀ p bseq.
BERNOULLI_TRIAL_F_IND 0 p bseq = ¬fst (prob_bernoulli p bseq)) ∧
∀ n p bseq.
BERNOULLI_TRIAL_F_IND (SUC n) p bseq =
fst (prob_bernoulli p bseq) ∧
BERNOULLI_TRIAL_F_IND n p (snd (prob_bernoulli p bseq))
`def (∀ p bseq. NTH_BERNOULLI_TRIAL_SND 0 p bseq = bseq) ∧
∀ n p bseq.
NTH_BERNOULLI_TRIAL_SND (SUC n) p bseq =
snd (prob_bernoulli p (NTH_BERNOULLI_TRIAL_SND n p bseq))
The first function, BERNOULLI TRIAL F IND returns True if and only if its first argu-
ment, say n, represents the positive integer index of a trial, in a sequence of independent
Bernoulli trials, that returns a False while all Bernoulli trials with lower index values
than n have returned a True. The second function NTH BERNOULLI TRIAL SND returns
the value of the snd element of the nth Bernoulli trial in a sequence of independent
Bernoulli trials, where n is the first argument of the function NTH BERNOULLI TRIAL SND.
In other words, it basically returns the unused infinite Boolean sequence after n inde-
pendent Bernoulli trials have been performed using the given infinite Boolean sequence.
Under the given assumptions of Theorem 8, it can be shown that a data message
available at the source list does finally make through the noisy channel at some time.
This can be verified in HOL, for the top element of the source list, by proving that
there exists some n for which the function BERNOULLI TRIAL F IND returns a True
` ∃ n. BERNOULLI_TRIAL_F_IND n p bseq
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for the given values of p and bseq. If a positive integer n exists that satisfies the above
condition, then it can be verified in HOL that the Geometric random variable, which
returns the number of trials to attain the first success in an independent sequence of
Bernoulli(p) trials, with success probability equal to (1 - p) can be formally expressed
as follows
` ∀ n p s.
0 ≤ p ∧ p < 1 ∧ BERNOULLI_TRIAL_F_IND n p s =⇒
(prob_geom (1 − p) s =
(n + 1,NTH_BERNOULLI_TRIAL_SND (n + 1) p s))
The HOL proof is based on the formal definition of the function prob geom and the
underlying probability theory principles, presented in [23].
Based on the above results, the proof goal of Theorem 8 can be simplified using
the definition of DELAY STOP WAIT NOISY and removing the Hilbert Choice operator as
follows
(∃x. (rem x = TL source) ∧ (rem (x − 1) = source)) ∧
∀x.
(rem x = TL source) ∧ (rem (x − 1) = source) =⇒
(x = (tf + tout) * n + tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1) ∧
(bseqt x = NTH_BERNOULLI_TRIAL_SND (n + 1) p bseq)
The above subgoal is quite similar to the one that we got after simplifying the proof
goal of Theorem 7. Therefore, we follow the same proof approach and assume the
following expression
Lemma 2: (rem ((tf + tout) * n + tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1 − 1) =
source) ∧
(rem ((tf + tout) * n + tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1) = TL source) ∧
(bseqt ((tf + tout) * n + tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1) =
NTH_BERNOULLI_TRIAL_SND (n + 1) p bseq)
to be True, which we will prove later, under the given assumptions of Theorem 8.
Lemma 2 leads us to prove the first Boolean expression in the our subgoal as now
we know an x = ((tf + tout) * n + tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1) for which
the given conditions (rem x = TL source) and (rem (x - 1) = source) are True.
The second Boolean expression in the subgoal can now be proved using Lemma 2
along with the monotonically decreasing characteristic of the history rem in a similar
way as we handled the counterpart while verifying Theorem 7.
The next step is to prove Lemma 2 under the assumptions given in the assumption
list of Theorem 8. We proceed in this direction by verifying a more generalized lemma,
under the assumptions of Theorem 8, for which Lemma 2 is a special case when v = 0.
Lemma 3: ∀ bseq v.
INIT_STOP_WAIT_GEN source rem s sink r i
ackR dtout dtf dta tout tf ta rec_flag bseqt bseq v ∧
BERNOULLI_TRIAL_F_IND n p bseq =⇒
(rem (v + (tf + tout) * n + tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1 − 1) =
source) ∧
(rem (v + (tf + tout) * n + tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1) =
TL source) ∧
(bseqt (v + (tf + tout) * n + tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1) =
NTH_BERNOULLI_TRIAL_SND (n + 1) p bseq)
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The first assumption in Lemma 3, i.e., the predicate INIT STOP WAIT GEN, provides the
status of the histories used in the predicate STOP WAIT NOISY at time v and is defined
as follows
`def ∀source rem s sink r i ackR dtout dtf dta tout tf ta rec_flag bseqt bseq v.
INIT_STOP_WAIT_GEN source rem s sink r i ackR dtout dtf dta tout tf
ta rec_flag bseqt bseq v =
(i v = 0) ∧ (dtout v = tout) ∧ (dtf v = tf) ∧ (dta v = ta) ∧
(bseqt v = bseq) ∧
(∀t.
t ≤ v =⇒
(rem t = source) ∧ (s t = 0) ∧ (sink t = []) ∧ (r t = 0) ∧
(rec_flag t = F) ∧ (ackR t = set_non_packet)) ∧
∀t. v − (tout − 1) ≤ t ∧ t < v =⇒ (i t = 1))
It can be proved to be a logical implication of the predicate INIT STOP WAIT, which is
included in the definition of STOP WAIT NOISY and is thus present in the assumption
list of Theorem 8, for the case when v = 0. Whereas, the second assumption in the
assumption list of Lemma 3, i.e., BERNOULLI TRIAL F IND n p bseq, has already been
shown to be a consequence of the assumptions of Theorem 8. Thus, Lemma 2 can be
proved as a special case of Lemma 3 when the positive integer variable v is assigned a
value of 0.
Now, in order to complete the formal proof of Theorem 8 in HOL, we need to verify
Lemma 3. We proceed with this proof by applying induction on the positive integer
variable n. For the base case, i.e., n = 0, we get the following subgoal after some basic
arithmetic simplification and using the function definitions of BERNOULLI TRIAL F IND
and NTH BERNOULLI TRIAL SND.
INIT_STOP_WAIT_GEN source rem s sink r i
ackR dtout dtf dta tout tf ta rec_flag bseqt bseq v ∧
¬fst (prob_bernoulli p bseq) =⇒
(rem (v + tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1 − 1) = source) ∧
(rem (v + tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1) = TL source) ∧
(bseqt (v + tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1) =
snd (prob_bernoulli p bseq))
The assumption ¬fst (prob bernoulli p bseq) ensures that the noisy data channel
allows reliable transmission of the first data message in the first trial. Thus, the base
case of Lemma 3 becomes similar to the case of a noiseless data channel, as far as the
transmission of the first data element of the source list is concerned. Therefore, its
proof can be handled in a similar way as the proof of Lemma 1, presented in the last
section, as the only difference between the two is the fact that now the initial conditions
are defined for an arbitrary positive integer v instead of 0. The corresponding HOL
proof step sequence is summarized in Table 3. These proofs are based on the definitions
of INIT STOP WAIT GEN and the predicates corresponding to the six processes, given in
Fig. 2, for the Stop-and-Wait protocol under a noisy data channel.
In the step case for Lemma 3, we get the following subgoal after some simplification
using the function definitions of BERNOULLI TRIAL F IND and NTH BERNOULLI TRIAL SND
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Table 3 HOL Proof Sequence for the base Case of Lemma 3
Number Formally Verified Statements
1 ∀t.v ≤ t ∧ t ≤ v+ tf⇒ (i(t) = 0)
2 ∀t.v− (tout− 1) ≤ t ∧ t < v+ tf⇒ (dataS t = set non packet)
3 ∀t.v ≤ t ∧ t < v+ tf+ tprop⇒ (dataR t = set non packet)
4 ∀t.v ≤ t ∧ t ≤ v+ tf+ tprop⇒ (bseqt t = bs)
5 ∀t.v ≤ t ∧ t < v+ tf+ tprop+ 1⇒ (sink t = []) ∧ (r t = 0)
6 ∀t.v ≤ t ∧ t ≤ v+ tf+ tprop+ 1⇒ (rec flag t = F) ∧ (dta t = ta)
7 ∀t.t < v+ tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta⇒ (ackR t = set non packet)
8 ∀t.v ≤ t ∧ t < v+ tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta+ tprop⇒ (ackS t = set non packet)
9 ∀t.v ≤ t ∧ t < v+ tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta+ tprop+ 1⇒
(s t = 0) ∧ (rem t = source)
10 (i(v+ tf+ 1) = 1) ∧ (dataS(v+ tf) = new packet 0 (HD source))
11 ∀t.v ≤ t ∧ t ≤ v+ tf⇒ (dtout t = tout)
12 ∀t.v+ tf < t ∧ t < v+ tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta+ tprop+ 1⇒
v+ tf+ tout− t ≤ dtout t
13 ∀t.v+ tf+ 1 ≤ t ∧ t ≤ v+ tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta+ tprop⇒
(i t = 1) ∧ (dataS t = set non packet)
14 dataR(v+ tf+ tprop) = new packet 0 (HD source)
15 ∀t.v+ tf+ tprop < t ∧ t < v+ tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta+ tprop⇒
(dataR t = set non packet)
16 (r(v+ tf+ tprop+ 1) = 1) ∧ (dta(v+ tf+ tprop+ 1) = ta)
17 ∀t.v+ tf+ tprop+ 1 < t ∧ t < v+ tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta+ tprop⇒ (r t = 1)
18 ∀t.v+ tf+ tprop+ 1 ≤ t ∧ t < v+ tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta⇒
(rec flag(t+ 1)) ∧ (dta(t+ 1) = v+ ta− (t− (tf+ tprop)))
19 ackR(v+ tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta) = new packet 0 ack msg
20 ackS(v+ tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta+ tprop) = new packet0ack msg
21 rem(v+ tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta+ tprop+ 1) = TL source
22 ∀t.v+ tf+ tprop < t ∧ t < v+ tf+ tprop+ 1+ ta+ tprop+ 1+ tprop⇒
(bseqt t = snd(prob bernoulli p bseq))
INIT_STOP_WAIT_GEN source rem s sink r i
ackR dtout dtf dta tout tf ta rec_flag bseqt bseq v ∧
fst (prob_bernoulli p bseq) ∧
NTH_BERNOULLI_TRIAL_F n p (snd (prob_bernoulli p bseq)) =⇒
(rem (v + (tf + tout) * (n + 1) + tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1 − 1) =
source) ∧
(rem (v + (tf + tout) * (n + 1) + tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1) =
TL source) ∧
(bseqt (v + (tf + tout) * (n + 1) + tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1) =
NTH_BERNOULLI_TRIAL_SND (n + 1) p (snd (prob_bernoulli p bseq))
which needs to be proved under the assumption list of Theorem 8 along with the
statement of Lemma 3. The above subgoal can be proved in a very straight forward
manner by specializing Lemma 3 for the case when bseq and v are equal to snd
(prob bernoulli p bseq) and (v + tf + tout), respectively, if the given initial con-
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Table 4 HOL Proof Sequence for Lemma 4
Number Formally Verified Statements
1 ∀t.v+ tf < t ∧ t < v+ tf+ tout⇒ v+ tf+ tout− t ≤ dtout t
2 ∀t.v+ tf < t ∧ t < v+ tf+ tout⇒ (i t = 1)
3 ∀t.v+ tf < t ∧ t < v+ tf+ tout⇒ (dataS t = set non packet)
4 ∀t.v ≤ t ∧ t < v+ tf+ tout+ tprop⇒ (dataR t = set non packet)
5 ∀t.t < v+ tf+ tout+ tprop+ 1⇒ (sink t = []) ∧ (r t = 0)
6 ∀t.v ≤ t ∧ t < v+ tf+ tout+ tprop+ 1⇒ (rec flag t = F) ∧ (dta t = ta)
7 ∀t.t < v+ tf+ tout+ tprop+ 1⇒ (rec flag t = F)
8 ∀t.t < v+ tf+ tout+ tprop+ 1⇒ (ackR t = set non packet)
9 ∀t.v ≤ t ∧ t < v+ tf+ tout+ tprop+ 1⇒ (ackS t = set non packet)
10 ∀t.t < v+ tf+ tout+ tprop+ 1⇒ (s t = 0) ∧ (rem t = source)
11 ∀t.v+ tf < t ∧ t ≤ v+ tf+ tout⇒ (dtf t = tf)
12 ∀t.v+ tf+ tprop < t ∧ t < v+ tf+ tout+ tprop⇒
(bseqt t = snd(prob bernoulli p bseq))
13 ∀t.v+ tf < t ∧ t < v+ tf+ tout⇒ (dtout t = v+ tf+ tout− t)
14 dtout(v+ tf+ tout) = tout
15 i(v+ tf+ tout) = 0
ditions in the predicate INIT STOP WAIT GEN hold for snd (prob bernoulli p bseq)
and (v + tf + tout), i.e.,
Lemma 4: INIT_STOP_WAIT_GEN source rem s sink r i ackR dtout dtf dta
tout tf ta rec_flag bseqt (snd (prob_bernoulli p bseq)) (v + tf + tout)
under the assumptions of Theorem 8 and the step case of Lemma 3. In order to prove
Lemma 4 we need to formally verify the behavior of the histories, used in the predicate
INIT STOP WAIT GEN, at various points in the interval [0, v + tf + tout]. Therefore,
we again use the same approach that we used to prove Lemma 1 and the base case
of Lemma 3, i.e., to verify the value of these histories using the initial conditions and
the definitions of the predicates used for the formal specification of the Stop-and-Wait
protocol. In fact, the first 11 proof lines, given in Table 3, for the base case of Lemma
3 can be used, as is, for the proof of Lemma 4 as well, since a message transmission
cannot complete before v + tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1 time units are lapsed
and the first data message is issued at time v + tf in both cases. Thereafter, con-
trary to the base case of Lemma 3, where one of the assumptions assured the reliable
transmission of the first data message, in the case of Lemma 4 we have the assumption
fst (prob bernoulli p bseq) that forces the channel to loose the first data message.
Thus, the sender keeps on waiting for a valid ACK until the timer associated with the
tout delay expires and this is how the initial state at time v is maintained until the
time v + tf + tout. We were able to verify this result, and thus Lemma 4, using the
first 11 proof lines, given in Table 3, followed by the proof sequence given in Table 4.
The proof of Lemma 4 concludes the proof of Lemma 3, which in turn leads to the
proof of Theorem 8 as well.
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Now, we are in the position of verifying the average message delay relation, given in
Equation 6, for the Stop-and-Wait protocol under noisy channels. The corresponding
theorem can be expressed in HOL as follows
Theorem 9: ` ∀source sink rem s i r ws sn ackty maxP abort dataS dataR
ackS ackR d tprop dtout dtf dta tf ack_msg ta tout rec_flag
bseqt bseq p.
(STOP_WAIT_NOISY source sink rem s i r ws sn ackty maxP abort
dataS dataR ackS ackR d tprop dtout dtf dta tf ack_msg ta tout
rec_flag bseqt bseq) ∧
LIVE_ASSUMPTION abort ∧
0 ≤ p ∧ p < 1 ∧ ¬(source = []) ∧
tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1 ≤ tout =⇒
(expec (DELAY_STOP_WAIT_NOISY rem source bseqt) =
(&(tf + tout) * p/(1−p) + &(tf + tprop + 1 + ta + tprop + 1)))
The above proof goal can be reduced to the following subgoal using Theorems 4
and 8 and some arithmetic simplification
` ∀ p. 0 < p ∧ p ≤ 1 =⇒
(expec
(λs.
(fst (prob_geom p s) − 1,
snd (prob_geom p s))) =
(1 − p) / p)
which we were able to verify in HOL, using the formalization of the expectation theory
and the Geometric random variable prob geom, given in [19], and the probability theory
principles, formalized in [23].
Theorem 9 specifies the average message delay relation of a Stop-and-Wait protocol
in terms of individual delays of the various autonomous processes, which are the basic
building blocks of the protocol. Thus, it allows us to tweak various parameters of the
protocol to optimize its performance for any given conditions. It is important to note
here that the result of Theorem 9 is not new and the performance analysis of Stop-and-
Wait protocols, based on Equation 6, existed since the early days of their introduction,
however, using theoretical paper-and-pencil proof techniques. On the other hand, to the
best of our knowledge, this is the first time that such a relation has been mechanically
verified without any loss in accuracy or precision of the results. It therefore provides a
superior approach to both paper-and-pencil proofs and simulation based performance
analysis techniques.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a higher-order-logic theorem prover based approach for
the functional verification and performance analysis of real-time systems. A real-time
system and its environment can be formalized as a logical conjunction of higher-order-
logic predicates on positive integers, whereas the positive integers represent the ticks
of a clock counting physical time in any appropriate units. Higher-order-logic has been
successfully used for the formalization of some parts of probability and expectation
theories. This feature allows us to use random variables in our model to represent the
random and unpredictable elements of a real-time system and its environment. The
functional and performance related properties, such as average characteristics, of a
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real-time system can now be formally verified, using this model, in a higher-order-logic
theorem prover. Due to the inherent soundness of the theorem-proving based analysis,
our approach ensures accurate and precise results and thus can prove to be quite useful
for the performance and reliability optimization of safety critical and highly sensitive
real-time system application domains, such as medicine, military or space travel. Sim-
ilarly, unlike other commonly used state-based formal techniques, which are severely
affected by the state-space explosion problem [8], the proposed approach is capable of
handling any real-time system that can be expressed mathematically due to the high
expressive nature of higher-order-logic. Also, there is no equivalence verification re-
quired between the models used for functional verification and performance evaluation
as the same formal model is used for both of these analysis in our approach.
In order to illustrate the practical effectiveness of our approach, we utilized it
to conduct the functional verification and performance analysis of a Stop-and-Wait
protocol using the HOL theorem prover. A higher-order-logic specification for the Stop-
and-Wait protocol is presented, with the noise effect modeled as a random variable.
We also outlined the major steps in the verification of performance related theorems.
The accuracy of the results has been one of the primary motivations of the proposed
approach. The Stop-and-Wait protocol case study clearly demonstrates this aspect as
the results match the ones obtained using traditional paper-and-pencil proof methods
and are thus 100% accurate. The next main feature of the proposed approach is the
ability to precisely reason about statistical properties, which is something that, to
the best of our knowledge, has not been achieved by any existing formal probabilistic
analysis technique. Our case study also demonstrates this feature as we presented the
formal verification of the classical average message delay relation for the Stop-and-
Wait protocol. Because of the fact that the Stop-and-Wait protocol bears most of
the essential characteristics of the present day real-time systems, our results clearly
demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed performance analysis approach.
The main limitation of the proposed approach, though, is the associated signifi-
cant user interaction, i.e., the user needs to guide the proof tools manually since we
are dealing with higher-order-logic, which is known to be non-decidable. Because of
this, the proposed approach should not be viewed as an alternative to methods such
as simulation and model-checking for the performance analysis of real-time systems
but rather as a complementary technique, which can prove to be quite useful when
analyzing systems for safety or financial critical domains where precision of the results
is of prime importance.
The formalization and verification presented in this paper, related to the analysis of
the Stop-and-Wait protocol, translated to approximately 6000 lines of HOL code and
consumed about 300 man-hours. In order to minimize the proof effort in this exercise,
we chose the discrete time domain for the analysis, which allowed us to use the powerful
induction technique for verification and thus minimize the proof effort considerably,
tried to build upon existing HOL theories whenever possible, which allowed us to
avoid developing new mathematical concepts from scratch, and used automatic provers
whenever we reached a subgoal that can be expressed in the decidable first-order logic.
In our experience with the analysis of the Stop-and-Wait protocol, we found theorem-
proving to be very efficient in book keeping. For example, it is very common to get
confused with different variables and mathematical notations and make human errors
when working with large paper-and-pencil proofs, which leads to the loss of a lot of
effort. Whereas in the case of mechanical theorem provers such problems do not exist.
Another major advantage of theorem proving that was experienced in our analysis is
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that once the proof of a theorem is established, due to the inherent soundness of the
approach, it is guaranteed to be valid and the complete proof steps can be readily
accessed contrary to the case of paper-and-pencil proofs.
The approach presented in this paper for the analysis of real-time systems is quite
general and can be extended with various new features and used for other kinds of
real-time systems as well. As a future work, we may consider the verification of other
statistical properties such as variance and tail bounds, which provide further insight
into the performance issues, may be included in the analysis based on the formaliza-
tion presented in [20]. The extension to other ARQ protocols, such as Go-back-N and
Selective-Repeat [13], is quite straightforward as they can also be formalized using the
process structure, presented in this paper, with modifications in the behavior of some of
the histories. Similarly, other real-time systems may also be analyzed using the existing
library of formalized discrete [23,19] and continuous random variables [18].
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